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1 INTRODUCTION 
One intention of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) is to promote 
the participation of small enterprises in the collective bargaining system in 
South Africa. This article sets out to explore the extent to which it can 
succeed in this aim. It examines. firstly. the nature and role of small 
enterprises and argues that the significance of small enterprises in the 
economy and employment creation has been exaggerated. Secondly. it 
identifies the sections in the LRA pertaining to collective bargaining and 
small enterprises and contests the claim that the latter are adequately 
accommodated by the legislation. 
These arguments are preceded by a look at the historical background to 
the LRA and are followed by a discussion of the major issues of dispute 
likely to beset collective bargaining under the new legislation. 
2 THE CONTEXT 
2.1 International trends 
In one respect the LRA was caught in a time-warp, largely due to its 
narrow national focus (in spite of reliance on foreign advice and reference 
to overseas legal practice). The world of the 1 980s was undergoing deep 
structural transformations. being shaped by international forces of such 
magnitude that no single (industrial) country could escape their fall-out. 
South Africa's re-integration into the world market could only but place 
even greater pressure on South Africa to conform to international trends. 
With globalisation, individual countries were drawn more dramatically 
into the imperatives of the world market. One result, over the last three 
decades, has been the sharp decline in the power of governments to 
shape independent national policies. Among other changes, there has 
been a dramatic increase in capital movements (undermining. among 
other things. exchange rate poliCies), a rapidly changing technOlogy, 
product market differentiation on a new scale, deep social and cultural 
changes (postmodernism) and in many countries, huge labour migrations. 
These massive changes naturally affected not only the power of gov-










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
by those states. This was primarily expressed in terms of declining union 
power and membership and, where industrial relations were concerned, a 
move away from centralised bargaining. Unions were unable to contain 
the fundamental shifts that were taking place. Some proved themselves, 
though, better able to deal with the new situation. Those union federations 
which recognised the fundamental and qualitative changes in progress 
were better able to cope with them. They adapted their strategies rapidly 
to deal with the changes and directly participated in the restructuring of 
production which was reflected in union membership. German trade 
unions, for example, took this approach and, in marked contrast to Britain 
and Holland, membership of German unions did not decline noticeably 
during the 1980s (Visser 1994: 82). 
In my view, South African unions did not show the prescience of the 
German unions, in spite of the fact that South Africans in the early 1990s 
were better placed to see the changes coming. Instead, they chose to 
shore up the system of centralised bargaining in the face of strong coun-
tervailing pressures. The LRA, then, was drawn up paying little attention 
to the drama taking place on the world stage of which South Africa was, of 
course, very much a part. 
2.2 Politics and struggle in South Africa: explaining the LRA 
It is not particularly controversial to argue that the LRA does not address 
the needs of small enterprises (representatives of small enterprises cer-
tainly have this perception). There are a number of reasons for this which 
relate to the power of small enterprises effectively to represent their own 
interests. [ want to argue, though, that there were particular historical cir-
cumstances which ensured that the interests of small enterprises were not 
taken more seriously, at least at the level of labour legislation. The political 
climate at the time the new LRA was drawn up precluded a more sympa-
thetic consideration of their specific requirements. This, in spite of the fact 
that other agencies of government' recognised the economic importance 
of small enterprises and their perceived potential role in creating entre-
preneurial opportunities for blacks and serving to reduce unemployment. 
How do we explain this? 
The historical circumstances of the LRA's gestation gave its birth a sig-
nificance far greater than one normally associated with legislative 
changes. The timing of its construction was not only of legal and SOCial 
importance but also of political and symbolic significance. As is well 
recorded, the labour movement played a key role in the ending of apart-
heid. In a sense, the LRA can be seen as the culmination of an historic 
labour struggle and a reward for the labour movement's political role in 
ending apartheid. The LRA reflects these sentiments rather than the post-
apartheid reality, which only slowly came to be recognised. as election 
promises encountered insuperable barriers regarding their implementation. 
I Eg. the Department of Trade and Industry investigated ways of promming small 










































SMALL ENTERPRISES. LABOUR RELATIONS ACT AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SA 
In large part, this can be explained in terms of the vec[Qrs of political 
power, both leading to and during the time of the LRA's formulation, 
which shaped it. The LRA resulted from negotiations between large em-
ployers and organised labour (at a time of its considerable political influ-
ence) and this shaped the character of the legislation, such that it excluded 
the voices of other interested parties. It is true that certain details of the 
legislation seem to run counter to my general characterisation. However, 
by focusing on the bigger picture, we will be better able to understand the 
assumptions behind the legislation, and why, at a fundamental level, it 
failed to address the interests of certain parries, in this case small and 
medium enterprises, notwithstanding certain assertions in the Explana-
tory Memorandum of the Draft Labour Relations Bill as published by the 
Ministry of Labour (henceforward, the Draft Bill 1995: 116-7). 
The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the pre-eminent 
trade union federation, was committed, broadly speaking, to two posi-
tions: that the legislation be comprehensive in its coverage and that it be 
informed by the principle of centralised bargaining. First, unions wished 
to ensure that the scope of the legislation encompassed workers previ-
ously excluded from the provisions of the old Act, in particular, farm 
workers and domestic labour. Second, as the Explanatory Memorandum 
states. H(t)he Bill promotes.. bargaining at a central or industry level" 
(Draft Bill 1995: 122) and it was through bargaining councils that this 
would be achieved. Where references are made to small and medium 
enterprises, they have less to do with taking serious account of their 
specific needs but, rather, are concerned to attract them into collective 
bargaining forums, based on the principle of centralised bargaining. 
Little thought was given either to the specific needs of different regions 
and sectors of the economy or the extent to which the LRA could be 
effectively implemented. For example, simply extending the scope of the 
legislation to farm workers and domestic workers cannot ensure that their 
bargaining capaCity is improved or that their unionisation would be made 
any easier. But the unions' position was consistent with their view that all 
workers must necessarily enjoy the same rights within a common frame-
work. Although the Act, in its final form, did not meet all the union de-
mands (Du Toit et al 1996: 29-32), it could nonetheless be judged as 
reflecting a shift in the balance of power between trade unions and em-
ployers in favour of the former 2 
The original political negotiations mirrored this, as the ANC pressed 
hard its view of a centralised and unified state. But the ANC was forced to 
take account of the realities of regional power and made some concessions 
2 Two main types of objection are advanced by left wing unionists and critics. One 
employs a functionalist mode of analysis and asserts that the legislation simply serves 
to reproduce the capitalist system based on the exploitation of labour. A second argues 
that certain details of the LRA, such as the commitment to workplace forums. are likely 
to weaken rather than strengthen trade union power. The first position is inherently 
ideological and cannot be rebutted by recourse to argument. The second is open to de-
bate but. in my view. it tends to focus on detail rather than the changed balance of 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
in this regard, even before the new state emerged (further changes, parti-
cularly in economic policy, came later). The unions, on the other hand, 
were not faced with opposition from a range of vested interests and 
merely had to deal with one powerful lobby, that is representatives of 
large employers, who could live with the legislation's broad sweep. The 
union movement did not have to take serious account of farmers or small 
enterprises and, in spite of good intentions, could not apply its mind 
methodically to the problems of the unemployed (which, of course, a 
government is forced to do). But, this did not mean that the reality of 
these problems could be wished away. The LRA was thus, from its incep-
tion, driven by organised labour and big industrial interests (see Du Toit et 
at 1996: 27) and was not obliged fully to account for those sectors of the 
economy, including the unemployed, which lay outside these two areas. 
However, in post-apartheid South Africa the labour movement, as with 
the ANC, has been forced to redefine its role. As the ANC soon discovered, 
for example, there is a chasm between an oppositional role, with a clearly 
identifiable enemy (but ill-defined poliCies), and the responsibilities of a 
party in power, which must be to lead and to govern, with all the con-
straints faced by such responsibilities. Similarly, the labour movement 
came to find itself in a much more ambiguous situation once its primary 
political goal had been attained and its political influence had begun to 
ebb. Its relation to the state (and its political allies) and employers had to 
change. They were forced to recognise, notwithstanding the influential 
role of former unionists in government, that the government could not 
pursue the unions' corporate interests. Also, employers could no longer 
simply be portrayed as part of the apartheid problem. In addition, macro-
economic issues were no longer the sole concern of a discredited govern-
ment but ones which the unions had to take more seriously. 
2.3 From RDP to GEAR 
The end of apartheid has resulted in a discursive shift from the language 
of opposition to one of construction. In economic policy, the focus shifted 
from redistribution and development to growth and this has transformed 
the rhetoric of economic discourse. The emphasis in government policy 
has shifted from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
to a macro-economic policy, Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
(GEAR). The concern with social services (housing, education, health) has 
lost ground to the needs of economic growth, currency stability and low 
inflation (as a necessary condition for postponed RDP programmes). The 
promised fruits of victory have given way to talk of budget-cutting and 
productivity. It was soon recognised that the RDP was not a short-term 
panacea. According to Wohlmuth, "a ten year time-frame (had been) a bit 
too optimistic" (1996: 19). The shift in the government's priorities has not 
gone unnoticed by critics within the ANC. It has been reported that senior 
ANC cadres believe "that government has sold out on the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme ... with most departments judged to have 
fouled up what was once the central component of the ANC's manifesto" 










































SMALL ENTERPRISES, LABOUR RELATIONS ACT AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SA 
There is ambivalence in the LRA's position on the question of its func-
tion in promoting an environment conducive to economic growth. "It 
seeks to balance the demands of international competition and the pro-
tection of the fundamental rights of workers" (Draft Bill t 995: t 16), but it 
is not made clear how these possibly opposing aims might be reconciled. 
More importantly, it aims "to give effect to the stated goals and principles 
of the RDP endorsed by the government" (ibid). This too is unclear. It 
could be interpreted as giving due attention to the unemployed who are 
clearly seen to be one of the potential beneficiaries of RDP. But the Act is 
not intended to deal with the unemployed. The comment thus appears as 
vague except to suggest an ideological commitment to a range of poliCies 
associated with such rhetoric, particularly regarding a more prominent 
role for trade unions in both production and politics. The LRA appears, 
then, as an expression of sentiments since superseded by events. How-
ever, it is not inconceivable that bargaining councils could assume a more 
flexible character than intended in facing up to GEAR and the problems of 
small enterprises and unemployment. 
3 SMALL ENTERPRISES 
Small and medium enterprises comprise the majority of firms in most 
industrialised countries and have done so for a long time, but it is only 
comparatively recently that they have been accorded the attention their 
numbers deserve. In fact, they have come to be seen as a key component 
of any modern economy although this was not always the case. 
3.1 The small enterprise as icon 
Before the 1970s, it was generally accepted that the engine of economic 
growth was to be found in increasingly large corporations with all the 
benefits attributed to them, such as economies of scale. According to 
Lane, the number of small enterprises in any country was regarded as 
directly proportional to the country's economic backwardness and, "until 
the 1970s, both academic and general social interest in them was scant" 
(Lane 1995: lOt). 
What gave rise to a change in this perception was the general economic 
crisis caused by the t 973 oil price rise and the subsequent recession in the 
industrialised countries. During the recession, there was a growth in small 
enterprises relative to large ones (partly due to the unemployed setting up 
their own businesses), which focused attention on their contribution to the 
economy and their future potential. At the same time, the rise to power of 
the political right, best represented by the shopkeeper's daughter, Britain's 
Margaret Thatcher, provided small enterprises with ideological endorse-
ment. Small enterprises came to symbolise individualism and entrepre-
neurialism and owners of such companies were considered "culture 
heroes" (Lane 1995: to I). 
When we come to examine their importance, it is therefore essential 
that we bear in mind how such perceptions shape our evaluation of small 
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are inclined to allow their analyses to be clouded by certain preconcep-
tions as to their imagined benefits. 
3.2 What is a smalI enterprise? 
From a policy point of view, if small enterprises are to be targeted for 
special treatment, it is important to agree on what they are and which 
among them are likely to succeed from such support. In most instances, 
the main criterion for distinguishing the category of enterprise is em-
ployee numbers. There is unfortunately no agreement as to what consti-
tutes a small firm (see Table 1) either in the international literature or 
materia! available in South Africa. For example, the government of the UK 
alone uses at least 40 different definitions (Storey et at 1987: 8 fn 1). 
Table 1 Definition of small enterprise (no of employees and assets and 
turnover) 
Micro Small 
SBDC < 200 
assets < R2m 
VOSLOO < 100 
NMC <50 
turnover < Rl m 
SUNNYSIDE < 21 
GROUP assets < R 1 00000 
turnover < R!4 m 
MTI <5 5-100 
EC <10 10-99 
SBDC Small Business Development Corporation 
NMC National Manpower Commission 
MTI Ministry of Trade and Industry 




assets 5:R 10m 
100-499 
Likewise in South Africa, there is no one definition of a small business as 
is clear from Table I. Classification can be broken down further according 
to country context' and by different sectors within industry. Other distinc-
tions also need to be made, most importantly between independent small 
enterprises and those tied to larger companies either directly through 
share-holdings or through contractual obligations or as dependants on 
specific large companies. 
3 Storey (1995: 14) notes that the European distinctions between SMEs and large enter-
prises are inappropriate for Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal which have relatively 
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3.3 The significance and performance of small enterprises 
As has already been suggested, the importance of small enterprises in 
economies might have been overstated and the evidence from both 
Europe and South Africa supports this. Research in Europe is more exten-
sive than it is in South Africa and it is helpful to consider some of the 
overseas findings before referring to South Africa. 
In some economies, it is true, small and medium enterprises make an 
important contribution to economic development and hold their own with 
the larger corporations. Japan and Italy (as well as some others such as 
Hong Kong and Taiwan), which boast technologically sophisticated small 
firms, are good examples of this (Weiss 1988: 4) but, in most countries in 
Europe, the evidence suggests that there has been a relative decline in 
small enterprises both in numbers and importance (Weiss 1988: 16), 
although Britain is an important exception (Storey 1995: 8). 
Those small firms that do make any serious contribution to economic 
growth comprise only a fraction of the total. According to Storey et ai, 
"only a few individuals have either the ability or the desire to be the 
engine of economic recovery" (Storey et al 1987: 326). In another context, 
Redding notes that in South Korea (where large corporations dominate the 
economy), "the survivors tend to have expanded rapidly, and it is on their 
shoulders that the economy rests, rather than on the large number of 
newcomers churning around at the bottom" (Redding 1988: 10). 
Contrary to what some observers believe, the importance of small en-
terprises in job creation is not particularly impressive (Rainnie 1989: 2; 
Storey et al 1987: 325; Lane 1995: I II) and, even then, it is only a very 
few which make a contribution to it (Storey et al 1987: 325). According to 
Lane (1995: 1 I 1), for Britain. Germany and France, the "annual contribu-
tion to employment creation (by small firms) is very modest indeed". 
Among other problems, there is a high failure rate among small enter-
prises, considerably higher than for larger ones (Storey et al 1987: 3). 
Mortality occurs most dramatically in the first few years and evidence 
from Britain suggests that. of the firms that fail in the first ten years. 50 % 
fail within two and a half years, 33 % in the next two and a half years and 
the rest in the following five years (Storey et al 1987: I I). 
3.4 Small enterprises in South Africa 
There is general consensus in South Africa that small and medium enter-
prises play an important economic role and can make a positive contribu-
tion to growth (Ministry of Trade and Industry 1994; NMC 1991; NMC 
Annual Report; Vosloo 1994). They currently employ a sizable proportion 
of the labour force (depending on how one estimates this) and make a not 
inconsiderable contribution to the GOP. It is further contended that small 
and medium enterprises can serve to reduce unemployment and also help 
meet the aims of the Reconstruction and Development Programme. 
Vosloo (former Managing Director of the Small Business Development 
Corporation (SBDC» argues that the advantages of small enterprises are 
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provide important links for medium and large businesses, are more in-
novative, grow faster than older firms, create jobs at a faster rate, have 
higher growth rates, act as vehicles for entrepreneurial talent, serve 
speCialised markets not catered for by large companies and contribute to 
political stability (Vosloo 1994: 166-68)4 Further, relatively low amounts 
of capital are required for SEs and they are easier to establish in rural and 
small urban areas (NMC 1991: 8). 
Where R.DP objectives are concerned, the National Manpower Commis-
sion (since superseded by the National Economic Development and 
Labour Council (N EDLAC) (NMC 1991: 9-10) emphasised the potential of 
small enterprises to redistribute opportunities, realise black aspirations, 
play a SOcialiSing role, help in the provision of housing and promote 
entrepreneurship. It is generally accepted in the South African literature 
that small firms can achieve these aims and therefore need to be encour-
aged. 
While small enterprises are generally viewed pOSitively, it is recognised 
that SEs face certain difficulties which do not apply to larger companies. 
Among others are the inability to raise capital and the high cost of it, the 
lack of purchasing power, shortage of entrepreneurial and managerial 
skills, low administrative capability and the inability to offer professional 
services (NMC 1991: 10). In addition to these problems, owners of small 
enterprises argue that they are severely constrained by regulations which 
govern their operations. Some even insist that the requirements and 
restrictions they face are so severe as to threaten their companies' exis-
tence.~' 
It is commonly believed that SEs have negative attitudes towards legiS-
lative restrictions which apply to their organisation and activities. They are 
therefore hostile to the institutions which seek to impose conditions on 
their operations. There "is an antagonistiC attitude vis-a-vis industrial 
councils, trade unions, the Department of Labour and other authorities" 
(MTI 1994: 26). Any proposals intended to promote SEs must therefore 
take seriously into account both the general lack of resources of all kinds 
and the restraints which they claim threaten their success. 
Numerically, by all accounts, the percentage of small businesses in 
South Africa is impressive although once again there are differences as to 
their Significance. In its 1990 Annual R.e po rt , the SBDC claimed that there 
were a total of I Am businesses in South Africa, the informal sector ac-
counting for 70% (NMC 1991: 7-8). For 1991, Vosloo estimated that there 
were 3 310 730 business entities, the informal sector comprising 75,5 % 
(Vosloo 1994: 169). According to the SBDC, 85 % of informal and formal 
businesses could be regarded as small (NMC 199 I: 8) based on their 
4 The MTI (1994: 9) makes the same point. that SEs provide "less scope for polarisation" 
than bigger firms and hence contribute [0 labour peace. 
5 Eg. Nina Kruger writes in a letter [0 the Sunday Times. November 27 1994. Business 
Times ("Labour laws threaten our business"). that her business will be forced to close 










































SMALL ENTERPRISES, LABOUR RELATIONS ACT AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SA 
criterion of small. It needs to be noted that the inFormal sector is the 
major constituent of small enterprises (mostly micro-enterprises). 
The contribution of small enterprises to the economy and employment 
depends on how wide the definition small enterprise is, particularly where 
employment is concerned. While all figures need to be treated with cau-
tion, as "the statistical base ... is still very poor ... " (MTI 1994: 8), they 
are useful as orders of magnitude. Beeld (NMC Annual Report: 41) reports 
that SMEs contribute 29 % to the GDP, an estimate in line with the SBDC's 
range of 25 % -35 % for small enterprises (NMC 1991: 8). According to the 
SBDC, small enterprises account for 38 % of employment opportunities 
and are responsible For an estimated 75 % of new jobs (NMC 1991: 8). 
Here, small includes the formal and inFormal sectors. 
If one includes the inform'al sector (most of which should be classified 
under micro-enterprises), then the contribution of small enterprises to 
employment is almost certainly significant but iF one distinguishes be-
tween the formal and informal sectors (see Table 2), the picture looks very 
different. Using Vosloo's figures, small and medium enterprises in the 
formal sector (up to 500 employees) account for 20,9 % of total employ-
ment compared with large businesses (approximately 0,00023 % of all 
firms) which employ 31,3 % of the labour force. The informal sector 
accounts for 30,4% of employment. Excluding the informal sector, small 
and medium enterprises (up to 500 employees) make up 97,5 % of busi-
nesses and account for 30 % of employment. Large businesses then 
account for 45 % of employment, the rest being employed by the state 
(Vosloo 1994: 169-70). 
In terms of employment, large businesses remain very important and 
account for approximately the same number of employed people as the 
informal sector (it is the informal sector, then, that assumes conSiderably 
more importance than formal small enterprises where employment is 
concerned). If one excluded medium-sized enterprises as defined by 
Vosloo (100-500 employees), the contribution of small enterprises to 
employment in the formal sector is unlikely to be impressive. If one uses 
the criteria for small enterprises as provided by the respondents in the 
Industrial Council Research Project survey (average less than 15 employ-
ees) (Du Toit et ai, 1995) or that of the Sunnyside group (up to 20 employ-
ees), the significance of small enterprises in the formal sector declines 
further. 
Finally, assuming the figures arrived at by Vosloo and the SBDC are ac-
curate and comparable, it appears that employment in small enterprises 
in the formal sector (including micro-enterprises) is very small indeed 
(Table 2). Discounting the differences in their definitions of small enter-
prises (Vosloo < 100 and the SBDC < 200) we come to the surprising 
result that formal sector small enterprises account for less than 8 % of 
total employment! Taking the formal sector alone, small enterprises would 
account for 10,9 % of employment. I F this is the case, arguments in favour 
of small enterprises in the formal sector that rely on their current contri-
bution to employment, rather than their estimated potential, are called 
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Table 2 Employees (%) by sector and size 
Formal &. Informal Formal only 
Small 7,6 10,9 
Medium 13,3 19,1 
Large 31,3 45 
State 17,4 25 
Informal 30,4 
Sources: Vosloo 1994; SBOC (NMC 1991) 
Other research confirms that small enterprises make a limited contribu-
tion to the South African economy and, in addition, suggests that there is 
no likelihood of this changing in the short term. In work undertaken for 
the World Bank, Levy found that, taking manufacturing employment 
alone, small enterprises (l0-99 employees) account for about 20 % of the 
total for manufacturing, which is below "international norms" (Levy, 
1996: 1). He is pessimistic about their ability to make any greater contri-
bution to the economy or make a difference to employment their 
"potential impact in the immediate future (is limited)" (Levy 1996: 2). This 
is compounded by the apartheid government's deliberate denial of educa-
tional opportunities for the majority of the population, as education is 
found to be a key in successful small ventures. Evidence around the world 
indicates that "most successful SMEs generally are run by highly educated 
and experienced entrepreneurs" (ibid). His findings lead him to conclude 
that "South Africa's pOlicymakers" will have to rely on larger companies 
"as key movers towards an efficient, outward-oriented and labor-
demanding path of industrial development" (ibid: 3). 
4 THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 
4.1 Collective bargaining. and small enterprises 
Collective bargaining is not only shaped by legislation but is informed by a 
variety of other factors, in particular the relative power of the antagonists, 
the structure of the economy and organisation of industry. One notable 
factor that is evident in Europe is the change in collective bargaining that 
is being driven by a sectoral and organisational change in the structure of 
the economy towards the service sector and Flexible organisation of 
production in manufa(:turing. There seem to be links between these 
Changes and the shift in the nature of bargaining, most notably, towards 
greater decentralisation (Ferner and Hyman 1993a: xx). There is every 
reason to believe that industry in South Africa is moving in the same 
direction and in this respect the LRA represents legislation driven by ideas 
of a former era, paying little attention to these structural transformations. 
When it comes to small enterprises in Europe, unions are poorly repre-
sented and the law alone is not sufficient to ensure compliance with its 
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institutional power of trade unions and employers' organisations is rela-
tively strong and legislatively guaranteed (Ferner and Hyman 1993b: 529; 
Rainnie 1989: 6; Weiss 1993: 109). Even in a highly regulated country 
such as Germany, statutory obligations to establish works councils in firms 
with five or more employees are ignored by most small enterprises (Weiss 
1993: 109). To what extent, then, can one hope that the LRA will succeed 
where more established systems have failed? 
4.2 South Africa 
A likely consequence of any law that does not accord with reality is that 
adherence to it will be diminished and might well bring the legislation into 
disrepute. The apartheid era is an excellent example of how the law failed 
to express the then current situation and was forced to' adapt to changed 
realities. In fact, the present LRA has emerged from the conflict between 
capital. labour and the state and to this extent can be seen as more practi-
cal compared to the formerly more ideological legislation and ad hoc 
amendments to it. 
It is quite likely that industry, in this case small enterprise, will simply 
disregard the legislation if its provisions are too onerous and I would guess 
that neither the state nor the unions would be able to do much about it, as 
European examples suggest. This obviously has serious implications for 
bargaining councils as well as trade unions. 
The legislation is lacking in specifics when it comes to small enterprises. 
It does not offer them something concrete but neither is there any dra-
matic new promise or threat in the legislation. While there are changes of 
emphasis, for the most part the status quo ante seems to be the case. 
4.3 The Labour Relations Act: provisions for small enterprises 
Although the LRA was passed by parliament on 13 September 1995, it 
only came into effect on Armistice Day (unintentionally. I suspect, but 
perhaps propitiously) the following year, 1 I November 1996. 
One of the professed aims of the LRA is to make provision for small and 
medium enterprises in South Africa's collective bargaining framework. It 
is implicitly recognised that small and medium enterprises reqUire a 
special dispensation to cater for their particular circumstances. But does 
the LRA succeed in giving small and medium enterprises noticeably more 
rights than was previously the case? Does it adequately take account of 
the problems of the labour market, the issue of centralised bargaining and 
the dispute over the latter between capital and labour? 
The LRA does not define a small enterprise, leaving this to individual 
bargaining councils." The legislation impacts on small enterprises in three 
main ways. 
6 Du TOil el al 1996 35 fn J 59 suggest thaI Ihere is an advantage in leaving Ihis !O each 
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One, they are exempted from establishing workplace forums which are 
intended for firms with 100 or more employees in cases where the major-
ity unions instigate them. Although this has been presented as part of the 
accommodation of small business (Draft Bill 1995: 117). it is almost 
certainly due to the impracticality of setting up forums in small enter-
prises." However. it is one of the few examples which does not fit the 
general tenor of the LRA in terms of comprehensive coverage. 
Secondly, the provisions for bargaining councils are intended to cover 
small enterprises, making some gestural concessions to their needs. In 
particular. the legislation refers to: 
• adequate representation 
• extensions of agreements 
• exemptions for non-parties (see infra). 
Thirdly, where a bargaining council does not exist for a sector, the LRA 
provides for statutory councils to be established by the Registrar. subject 
to satisfying him/herself that the applicants (employers' associations or 
trade unions) are representative. whether or not there is any agreement 
between the parties. The powers of statutory councils are not as extensive 
as bargaining councils and exclude collective bargaining unless the parties 
come to agree to it (Du Toit et at 1996: 145-149). However, they serve to 
extend regulation to recalcitrant parties. which would include small enter-
prises, on a sectoral level. They also serve the purpose of compelling 
parties to act together in. for example, dispute resolulion which could lead 
to collective bargaining arrangements and subsequently the establishment 
of bargaining councils. The provision on statutory councils is, then, consis-
tent with extending coverage and is intended "to partly accommodate 
COSATU's demand for greater compulsion towards centralised bargain-
ing" (ibid: 145). 
4.4 Bargaining councils 
Bargaining councils are the statutory forums governing collective bargain-
ing in South Africa and it is through them that the LRA proposes to regu-
late small and medium enterprises, They, therefore, serve as a departure 
point for a discussion of centralised bargaining and small enterprises, 
However, one could argue that their importance is as much symbolic as 
real, considering that at present bargaining council agreements cover only 
a small proportion of the economically active population in South Africa. 
In 1993, out of an economically active population in excess of 14 million, 
it was estimated that council agreements (including extensions) only 
covered about 850 000 (Du Toit et at 1995: 90), 
In the most important bargaining councils, large employer interests 
tend to be better represented than those of small firms but this does not 
7 Germany's Manf'red Weiss was part of the legal task team which drafted the new 
legislation and one suspects that he influenced the deliberations with regard to work-
place forums, The failure of works councils in small enterprises in Germany (Weiss 
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apply to all councils. The issue of small enterprise representation on 
bargaining councils is not in all cases a serious matter of concern. In 
certain sectors, virtually all the firms are small (and medium) and here 
they would be effectively represented in bargaining councils. For example, 
the majority of firms in hairdressing and the electrical trade are small (Du 
Toit et al 1995: 49), But a significant proportion of sectors are dominated 
by large companies and it is these bargaining councils with which we are 
mainly concerned. 
Three sections of the Act affect small enterprises directly, In the first 
place, bearing in mind the stated preference for centralised bargaining, 
the Act aims to encourage small enterprise participation in bargaining 
councils. . 
• Section 30( I )(b) requires that a bargaining council constitution pro-
vides for adequate representation of small and medium enterprises 
and the registrar must satisfy himself or herself of such provision be-
fore registering a bargaining council (s 29( 11 )(b)(iii». 
• The legislation allows for the extension of bargaining council agree-
ments to non-parries within the scope of the council (s 32(1) and (2)) if 
certain conditions are met (relating mainly to representivity of party 
employers and trade unions in the sector) (s 32(3) and (4», 
• An important change from the current legislation is that it is no longer 
at the Minister's discretion whether to extend the agreement or not, 
although the Minister has to be satisfied as to the representivity of the 
parties to the agreement. 
• The decision on exemptions for non-parties is no longer to be decided 
by the council. 
• The collective agreement must provide for an independent body to 
consider exemptions for non-parties and must set out the criteria 
which must be applied in considering exemptions (s 32(3)(e) and (f), 
The establishment of this body is a precondition for the extension of 
agreements. But its terms of reference were weakened between the 
negotiating document (Draft Bill s 35(3)(d» and the final Act (s 32(3)(e» in 
response to union demands. The Draft Bill proposed that the body should 
take into account "undue hardship" when considering exemptions but this 
was subsequently omitted from the LRA (Nattrass and Seekings 1997: 45), 
The intention o'f the legislation is ostenSibly to incorporate small enter-
prises into the bargainil'!,g council system by ensuring representation. 
However, it is not clear that these proposals are likely to achieve their 
intended purpose, 
The proposals regarding adequate representation are obviously aimed 
at encouraging small (and medium) enterprises to become parties to 
councils in order to ensure that their interests be catered for. However, 
there is no stipulation of the criteria for adequate representation and no 
suggestion about how adequate representation might be translated into 
effective agreements, particularly where small enterprise is likely to con-
stitute a minority as in most bargaining councils, 
The section dealing with the extension of agreements leaves the 
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"representation", but which, in practice. would likely mean the exclusion 
of smaller registered firms from decisions in this matter. More seriously. 
the firms to be covered by extensions would have no (representational) 
say in the matter, except by invitation. In other words, there is no 
mechanism to ensure that bargaining councils take proper account of the 
needs of non-parties. 
The provision for an independent body to consider exemptions is likely 
to have an unintended consequence in regard to one of the aims of the 
LRA, that is. drawing small firms into the statutory bargaining forums. 
Although adequate representation and extensions might act as incentives 
to participate in bargaining councils. the exemption provision could have 
the effect of discouraging small enterprises from becoming parties to the 
council. Why submit to council discipline when one's interests might be 
better served by appeal to an independent body? It appears that the 
proposed legislation allows for a duplication of exemption procedures. 
There is no stipulation in the legislation that small enterprises within the 
system (ie those that belong to employers' associations party to the 
council) will have recourse to independent bodies for exemption consid-
eration. Presumably, this would be at the discretion of the parties to the 
council. It is conceivable, then, that bargaining councils or their sub-
committees, would attend to applications from party members and the 
independent bodies to those of non-parties. It is not certain whether the 
same criteria would apply in both cases. Small enterprises would likely see 
their interests better served by an independent body and thus decide 
against representation on councils where the option might not be ac-
corded them. 
In my view, there is no reason to believe that the new proposals are 
likely to improve small enterprise representation over that which existed 
in the former industrial councils. The only way this could be achieved is 
through the requirement that all employers be represented in bargaining 
councils. which was COSATU's preferred option (unpublished report on 
the Draft Bill 1995) but opposed by employers. COSATU favours central-
ised bargaining. to be achieved through all party representation on bar-
gaining councils. Although the thrust of the LRA favours centralised 
bargaining, it falls short of compelling it, which allows for continued dif-
ferences over the extent of its implementation. 
4.5 LRA: an impediment to small enterprises? 
There are loud voices of opposition to the provisions of the LRA from 
small enterprises. There is a common perception. because it is widely 
aired, that it is perhaps the crucial difficulty facing small enterprises. Yet, 
one needs to ask how the LRA rates as a barrier to entry into the market 
for small enterprises compared to other impediments. Levy's research, 
undertaken in 1993. found that "regulatory and industrial relations con-
straints emerge ... as moderate-to-Iow constraints" (Levy 1996: 14), 
which include trade unions and industrial councils (as they were called at 
the time). Within this category, 61 % of the respondents identified trade 
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councils (ibid). While Levy (1996: 28) argues for greater "labor market 
flexibility". his general conclusions suggest that interventions in favour of 
small enterprises are unlikely to improve their performance dramatically 
in the near future (Levy 1996: 25). 
5 THE FUTURE 
Many of the disputes that informed the discussions leading to the LRA will 
not disappear with its promulgation. We need to revisit the main issues 
which are likely to persist in the future and the extent to which there is 
sufficient flexibility in the legislation to accommodate differences. 
5.1 Centralised bargaining 
One of the main disputes between representatives of capital and COSATU 
which persists is over centralised bargaining and their historic differences 
as to its merits remain pertinent. COSATU prefers the full incorporation of 
small enterprises into bargaining councils. Certain spokespersons for 
capital believe that bargaining councils are inflexible and hence unable to 
fulfil their promise to small enterprises. Anglo-American Corporation's 
Michael Spicer argues that "the track record (of centralised bargaining and 
industrial councils) is of inflexibility and the destruction of jobs" (SALB 
1994: 29). 
The International Monetary Fund also opposes strict centralised bargain-
ing and extensions. In the Fund's opinion, "greater importance should be 
accorded to regional disparities in the cost of living in nationally negoti-
ated wage agreements, and the statutory extension of such agreements to 
firms (especially small firms) not party to them should be curtailed" 
(Sunday Times, Business Times 9 April 1995). 
The unions reject these views and argue that centralised bargaining can 
accommodate the needs of small enterprises. Von Holdt (Business Report. 
Cape Times, 20 June 1995) insists, contrary to the views of Michael Spicer, 
that flexible arrangements can be made in bargaining councils and as an 
example refers to the agreements in the clothing sector (see also Baskin 
1994). He believes that the legislation would help ensure such compro-
mises are met. The substance of the argument seems to be less about 
flexibility and more about where it will be controlled and exerCised, inside 
or outside bargaining councils. 
In spite of their differences, there is some evidence of flexibility in the 
relationship between capital and labour. In addition to compromises in the 
clothing sector, there is movement over issues of wages. On the question 
of wage levels, even though there is sharp disagreement within the union 
movement, there is serious debate about an incomes policy tied to an 
increased social wage (Von Holdt 1994; Coleman 1994). Further, public 
works projects (particularly in non-urban areas) are paying task related 
daily wages below union rates with the agreement of the unions. These 
initiatives point to some willingness on the part of capital, labour and the 
state to work together in constructing solutions to the problems facing the 
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5.2 The labour market 
Two of the intractable problems regarding labour in South Africa are the 
high rate of unemployment and the extent of economic activity confined 
to the informal sector. Hence, the labour market is such as to make the 
establishment of centralised bargaining particularly difficult. These factors. 
together with the need to encourage black entrepreneurship, place severe 
constraints on the establishment and maintenance of uniform standards 
across sectors. In the light of this, centralised bargaining must of necessity 
be limited in its application, and. similarly, the role of bargaining councils. 
However laudable their aims, unions cannot hope to universalise labour 
regulation in South Africa and I believe that attempts to achieve this will 
diminish their effectiveness where they are better able to exercise their 
power. Examples elsewhere in more conducive situations suggest that at 
best unions can hope to cover no more than 70 % of the labour force 
(I take this figure from Holland. where, in spite of a low union density, the 
statutory strength of trade unions is considerable and extension of agree-
ments very effective (Du Toit et al 1995: 74». The nature of the labour 
market in South Africa (with a large percentage of its labour force in the 
informal sector and high unemployment) is much less homogeneous than 
in Europe and hence that much more difficult to cover legislatively. The 
segmented labour market is a harsh reality in South Africa and no legisla-
tion or even strong unions can wish it away or hope to include disparate 
sectors within a single regulatory net. 
There is, of course, recognition from individuals sympathetic to the la-
bour movement that there are deep divisions in the South African labour 
market. Dave Lewis, the co-chairperson of the Labour Market Commis-
sion, acknowledged that a central problem for the Commission was how 
to "set wages in the primary market so that it doesn't permanently close 
itself off from the secondary markets". His approach seemed to be one of 
incorporation and fleXibility. In his opinion. there was a need to widen 
"the regulatory net in order to relax it and relaxing it in order to widen it" 
(interview with Lewis). But it is questionable whether bargaining councils 
could accommodate the degree of flexibility that this suggests. 
It is indeed important that labour standards be ensured (which need not 
necessarily include wages) and the labour movement has a crucial role to 
play in this regard. But this cannot be achieved by assuming that struc-
turally. industry is homogeneous. or that there is an undifferentiated 
labour force. 
So, in considering small industry. due regard has to be given to their 
particular problems which by all accounts are very different from those of 
large companies. Any demands for a special dispensation requires careful 
examination of claims regarding small enterprise contribution to eco-
nomic growth and job creation. Whether the problems of small enterprises 
can be solved through bargaining councils remains an open question. 
CONCLUSION 
The uniform regulation of small enterprises in the face of massive unem-
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cannot be achieved with any certainty. The importance of ensuring labour 
standards cannot be denied but they have to be maintained in the Face of 
these constraints. 
The extent to which certain small enterprises should be targeted For 
special treatment, either in terms of economic incentives or regulatory 
concessions, depends in part on their ability to demonstrate their contri-
bution to the economy and employment creation. Why subsidise small 
enterprises or make concessions over labour regulations if they are un-
likely to fulfil their promise? 
Currently it appears that the informal sector employs more people than 
small enterprises. IF Levy's pessimistiC view of small enterprise potential is 
right, then, rather than pinning one's hopes on the growth of small enter-
prises, promotion of the informal sector might in the short term be more 
effective in alleviating poverty and creating employment. 
The LRA is not where an examination of small enterprises can begin. 
Arguments for or against the incorporation of SEs into bargaining councils 
cannot be judged from within the system itself as there are major parties 
who do not believe that their interests can best be heard there. 
The degree to which SEs will comply with regulations depends, among 
other things, on union presence at the plant level. The evidence suggests 
that unions are poorly represented at the lower end of small enterprises 
(up to 20 employees) (Levy 1996: 14) and it is in these that the legislation 
is less likely to have any effect. Further, the capacity of bargaining coun-
cils to police agreements is limited, which is confirmed by union dissatis-
faction with industrial councils' inspectorates (Du Toit et al 1995: 38). This 
evidence might suggest that, rather than treating small enterprises as a 
single category, they should be dealt with according to their size. 
Finally, in terms of its intentions and provisions, the LRA does not make 
any significant concessions to small enterprises, and bargaining councils 
are likely to act as impediments to them. In addition, there is a strong 
case to be made that it acts as a deterrent to entry into the market. As the 
law stands, any regulatory concessions will have to rely on the parties to 
bargaining councils, which will be dominated by big enterprises and trade 
unions. However, with trade unions showing some flexibility and with 
predictable pressure from black entrepreneurs, one can anticipate com-
promises being struck. 
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